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Scope of the Comment
The executor or administrator of a decedent's estate has a
general duty to account to the beneficiary; a duty based in common
law, existing independently of statute.' The duty is, in essence, that
of a fiduciary to account to those for whom he acts.2 When certain
conditions exist, however, the accounting may be waived, releasing
the executor or administrator from his fiduciary duty. Since relief
from the duty of accounting means a savings in time and expense
in probating an estate, the busy attorney should be aware of those
situations where waiver is applicable. But even more important, the
attorney should attempt to reduce wherever possible the complexity
of probate work for the sake of his client. Among laymen, there is
a popular dislike of probate proceedings, particularly when the
estate is relatively small.3 Such an attitude results in people turning
to devices of doubtful legality to accomplish their testamentary
goals, often contrary to professional advice.'
This comment, therefore, discusses and attempts to reconcile
the advantages of saving time and expense by waiver of the ex-
ecutor's duty to account with the need of conforming to the strict
requirements of law imposed upon one who stands in a fiduciary
relation to others. The purpose of this analysis is to serve as a basis
for suggested legislative clarifications of California's posture on
waiver of accounting.
Present Posture of Waiver of Accounting
The accounting of the executor or administrator of an estate
is a report, a synopsis of his administration. 5 It sets forth the value
1 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Lindholm, 66 F.2d 56, 59 (9th Cir. 1933).
2 Smith's Estate, 122 Cal. App. 2d 216, 218, 264 P.2d 638, 639 (1953). See
generally, 2 BANCROFT, PROBATE PRACTICE § 340 (2d ed. 1950); 20 CAL. JuR. 2d
Executors & Administrators § 14 (1955).
3 Roseberry, Handling Small Estates, 85 TRUSTS & ESTATES 408 (1947).
4 Ibid.
5 Estate of Rose, 63 Cal. 349, 351 (1883).
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and nature of all assets and income over which the representative
had or has control, or received in his representative capacity.6
California's Probate Code section 922 says, ". . the executor
or administrator must render a full and verified account and report
of his administration . . . ." Such an accounting must be made
(a) whenever required by the court upon suitable motion,' (b)
within thirty days after expiration of the time for filing claims
against the estate,8 (c) when the estate is in a proper condition to
be closed,9 and (d) annually after the order of distribution is made
if there is any property remaining undelivered to distributees. ° An
accounting may also be required of the executor or administrator
when his authority is terminated or revoked,11 or if he dies or be-
comes incompetent.' 2
Any of the above statutory accountings required of the executor
or administrator may be waived by the sole beneficiary of the estate
when (a) the beneficiary is also the executor, (b) all claims have
been paid, and (c) the time for filing claims has expired. Waiver
under such circumstances was established in California by Middle-
cof v. Superior Court.'8
In Middlecoff, the decedent's will left a small legacy to two
daughters, and the residue to the widow-executrix. The legacy was
paid, and the two daughters assigned all their rights in the estate
to their mother, the widow-executrix. Thus the widow became the
sole beneficiary of the estate. All claims having been paid, and the
time for filing'claims having expired, the executrix petitioned the
court for distribution. She pointed out that an accounting was use-
less because she was the sole distributee. Agreeing, the probate court
decreed as the executrix prayed. A few years later Mrs. Middlecoff,
one of the daughters who had assigned her interest, brought
mandamus proceedings to compel her mother, the executrix, to ac-
count. The highest state court pointed out that the statutory require-
ments of accounting were for the benefit and protection of the
executor, beneficiaries, and creditors.' 4 Since the creditors had been
paid, and the executrix was by assignment and conveyance the sole
beneficiary, the requirements for accounting could be waived." The
6 4 BANCROFT, PROBATE PRAcTIcE § 940 (2d ed. 1950).
7 CAL. PROB. CODE § 921.
8 CAL. PROB. CODE § 922.
9 Ibid.
10 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1063.
11 CAL. PROB. CODE § 923.
12 CAL. PROB. CODE § 932.
13 149 Cal. 94, 84 Pac. 764 (1906).




court said that in such a situation there was ". . . no real necessity
for an accounting"; 16 that the widow-executrix, ". . . as the sole
person interested, had the right to waive the rendition and settle-
ment of such account, and to consent that the distribution might be
made without such intermediate proceedings.' '17
The court did not give any statutory authority for the waiver
of a law by the one for whose benefit it was intended. However, such
authority existed. Then and now, the law is that, "Anyone may
waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit."' 8
The statutory requirements of accounting litigated in Middle-
coff were found in the Code of Civil Procedure 9 which in part
codified the Probate Act of 1851 20 Middlecoff , however, is still ap-
plicable today. The duties to account there litigated are essentially
the same as those in the present Probate Code.2'
That Middlecofi is still good law in light of the present Probate
Code is evidenced in a 1963 case, Estate of McManus.2 This case
concerns an attorney who was discharged by the estate prior to final
distribution. The attorney contended in the appellate court, among
other points, that the probate court erred in allowing distribution
without requiring an accounting upon his objection. The attorney-
appellant argued that he was a party interested in the estate and
could therefore compel an accounting. The court held in part that
the probate court did not err in approving the administratrix's
waiver of accounting, for the circumstances came under Middle-
coff.28 The court further said that the appellant lacked good faith as
his only reason in demanding an accounting was to block and harass
the administratrix s4
In summary, then, California's present statutory requirements
for accounting may be waived when (a) the executor is also the sole
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513. Note that this statute continues: "But a law established
for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement." Note further
that "anyone" would probably be limited by California courts to any one of full
age and sui juris, although there is no California authority on this point. See gen-
erally, 56 Am. JuR. Waiver § 11 (1947).
19 149 Cal. 94, 97, 84 Pac. 764, 765 (1906). California Probate Code was not en-
acted until 1931; see Stat. of Calif., 1931, c. 281, p. 587.
20 Stat. of Calif., 1851, c. 124, p. 448. See generally, legislative histories of
California Probate Code sections 921-923, 932, 1063, contained in DEEDiNG'S CALIFOR-
NIA CODES ANNOTATED (1959).
21 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2 regarding construction of the Probate Code. For
a table of the derivations of the various California Probate Code sections, see
Stat. of Calif., 1931, appendix p. 3178.
22 214 Cal. App. 2d 390, 29 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1963).




beneficiary, (b) all claims have been paid, and (c) the time for
filing claims has expired.25 Suppose, however, that the situation was
this-co-executors of a will are together the only beneficiaries; or
this-the sole beneficiary is a person distinct from the executor.
Would the Middlecoff rule permit waiver of accounting? Take an
even more common situation: two or more adult beneficiaries, all
children of the deceased. One is appointed executor; all are on good
terms. May these beneficiaries waive accounting? Not under a strict
application of Middlecoff. Yet logically and practically, there is
much to say for the option of waiver of accounting in all these cases.
In many situations, probably most, it is better for all concerned if
the executor accounts as provided by statute. But in others, the
option of waiver of the accounting by all interested parties would
result in saving time and expense. Several states allow, even favor,
private settlements of the estate to release the executor of the duty
to account.26
In essence, the question of when to waive accounting is based
upon reconciliation between the advantages of saving time and ex-
pense and the duty of a fiduciary to account for the administration
of the decedent's estate. Also involved is the extent to which those
for whose benefit a law is intended may modify that law.
WAIVER OF ACCOUNTING
Arguments Pro
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.27 It
is a means of making the law flexible; a means to adapt general and
static rules to the varying individual applications of the law. The
general rule of waiver in California is established by statute: "Any-
one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his bene-
fit."2 To accomplish waiver there must be (a) an existing right or
benefit, (b) knowledge of its existence, and (c) actual intent to
relinquish it.29 There is an exception when the law exists for a public
reason,80 namely, there can be no waiver of a law which protects
25 Brief references to waiver of accounting under Middlecoff are made in the
following: CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA ESTATE AD-
MINISTRATION § 37.57 (1959); 21 CAL. JUR. 2D Executors & Administrators § 688
(1955); 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills & Probate § 285 (1960).
26 34 C.J.S. Executors & Administrators § 834 (1942).
27 Brown v. Cranston, 214 Cal. App. 2d 660, 668, 29 Cal. Rptr. 725, 729 (1963).
Note that waiver may be express or implied; that knowledge of the right may be
actual or constructive.
28 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513.
29 51 CAL. JUR. 2d Waiver § 3 (1959).
80 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513.
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the general public, and promotes general welfare rather than bene-
fiting a small percentage of citizens."
Middlecoif, Civil Code section 3513,32 and many cases applying
section 3513 imply that waiver is limited to a single party trans-
action.88 But words used in the Civil Code in the singular number
include the plural.8 4 Hence in other cases, two or more people are
allowed to waive the benefit of a law intended solely for their
benefit.8
5
Waiver under California's Civil Code section 3513 has been
extended by the court in Estate of Shapiro86 to waiver by more than
one person. Why, then, cannot waiver of accounting under Middle-
coif be so extended? Note the similarities of Middlecoff and Shapiro,
not factually, but in effect. In Middlecoif, a requirement intended
to protect a beneficiary is waived; the same is true in Shapiro. In
Middlecoif, the court interpreted the statutory requirements of ac-
counting to be ". . . for the benefit and protection of the executor
and the beneficiaries of the estate . . . including the creditors.""'
In Shapiro, the requirement that the trustee furnish a bond was
"... for the benefit of the beneficiaries and creditors of a trust."8
In both cases, the apparent purpose of the statutory requirements
-accounting in Middlecoff, bonding in Shapiro-is to maintain high
standards of fiduciary duty. In both cases, fiduciary duties are
waived. Therefore, if more than one beneficiary can waive a bond
in Shapiro, the same should be true of an accounting.
Before proceeding, a distinction must be made between a waiver
of any accounting and waiver of statutory requirements of ac-
counting. Of course, the situation in Middlecoff is a complete waiver
31 Benane v. International Harvester Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 874, 878,
299 P.2d 750, 753 (1956).
32 Read literally, the language of this statute restricts waiver to a single party
transaction: "Anyone may waive .. .a law intended solely for his benefit." [Em-
phasis added.]
33 See, e.g., Benane v. International Harvester Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 874,
878, 299 P.2d 750, 752 (1956), wherethe court refers to the doctrine of waiver saying,
"Provided, however, such rights and privileges rest in the individual and are intended
for his sole benefit." [Emphasis added.]
84 CAL. CIv. CODE § 14.
35 See, e.g., Estate of Shapiro, 79 Cal. App. 2d 731, 734, 181 P.2d 117, 118
(1947), where the court allowed the five sole beneficiaries of a testamentary trust to
waive the requirements of California Probate Code section 1127 that a trustee of a
testamentary trust shall give a bond; the court said, "The beneficiaries ...were en-
titled to waive the advantages of a law intended for their benefit." However the court
does not interpret California Civil Code section 3513 directly, but only in effect. There
is no direct application in Shapiro of the rule in California Civil Code section 14 con-
cerning plurality of the singular number.
36 Ibid.
37 149 Cal. 94, 97, 84 Pac. 764, 765 (1906).
38 79 Cal. App. 2d 731, 734, 181 P.2d 117, 118 (1947).
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of any accounting, including the one required by statute. Clearly
it is pointless for one to account as executor when no one may con-
test that accounting but the same person in his capacity as the sole
interested party. But there are other situations where it may be
advantageous to waive the statutory accounting, yet still make some
other form of accounting to interested parties. The interested parties
may wish to agree among themselves and with the executor as to the
performance of the executor's administration of the estate, and then
waive the statutory accounting. They thereby accomplish a private
accounting. Such a private accounting, written or oral, made only
to the interested parties, withholds the affairs of the estate from the
public records of the court. In the absence of fraud or misrepresenta-
tion, such private agreements, accompanied .by a written waiver of
statutory requirements of accounting, should be upheld.
Some states regularly allow waiver of formal or statutory ac-
counting when an informal accounting or release has been made.89 In
New York, for example, waiver of statutory accounting is favored
by the courts. In re Amuso's Estate" points out that there is a
long line of cases in New York encouraging agreements and settle-
ments which ". . . in effect dispense with the expense and delay
inherent in formal accounting proceedings."'" Two early cases cited
by Amuso's Estate in this line are two of the five Middlecoff relied
upon for its holdings.42 One of these, In re Pruyn,4 an example of
waiver, upheld mutual releases between two co-executors and the
guardians of two minor legatees. One of the co-executors, also a
beneficiary, later attempted to compel an accounting by his co-
executor. The court held that his release blocked a subsequent ac-
counting for his benefit, but pointed out that the minors could have
an accounting, if they wished, upon reaching their majority, notwith-
standing release by their guardians." Such a release is in effect a
waiver of statutory accounting by private agreement. The effective-
ness of private accounting and settlement, accompanied by release
or waiver, is noted in a later case, In re Kahn's Will,48 where the
court says, ". . . such an informal accounting is as effectual for all
intents and purposes as a settlement pursuant to a judicial decree. '46
Other states also allow private accounting and settlement to
89 34 C.J.S. Executors & Administrators § 834 (1942).
40 13 Misc. 2d 686, 176 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
4' Id. at -, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
42 In re Pruyn, 141 N.Y. 546, 36 N.E. 595 (1894); In re Wagner's Estate,
119 N.Y. 28, 23 N.E. 200 (1890).
43 In re Pruyn, supra note 42.
44 Ibid.
45 144 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
46 ld. at 254; cf. In re Kirby's Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
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waive statutory requirements of accounting. Another case cited in
Middlecoff as authority is In re Barber's Estate.47 This is a Penn-
sylvania case where the testator's partner, widow, and her brother
were co-executors, the widow being sole beneficiary. The two men
made a private accounting to the widow and she then released them
from liability. By this release, all three co-executors waived statu-
tory accounting ". . . simply to escape the expense of such a pro-
ceeding." '48 This waiver was upheld against the widow who later
sought to compel the statutory accounting.
In an Arkansas case, Herndon v. Adikisson,49 the creditors
having been paid, the statutory requirements for accounting were
waived by agreement of all the heirs and distributees of the estate.
The court said, "Such agreements are not against public policy. In-
deed, the settlement of decedent's estate. by family agreement is
greatly favored by the courts."5
In Pennsylvania, In re Estate of Hammer5 saw petitioners
seeking to force the co-executors to file an accounting. The peti-
tioners contended that the executors had both a statutory duty and a
fiduciary duty to account. Their petition was declined because they
had been parties to a family agreement which dispensed with the
statutory accounting, thereby waiving it.
In addition to waiver of statutory accounting by private agree-
ment or accounting, New York appears to allow waiver of any ac-
counting whatsoever. In re Amuso's Estate52 notes by way of dictum
that even a private accounting by a fiduciary can be waived if the
beneficiary receives a fair opportunity to have one, ". . . and he
affirmatively waives his right."" Such waiver is no more than an
application of the general rules of waiver.54
Arguments Con
There is no California authority which directly opposes an
extension of the Middlecoff rule along the lines of Shapiro. The
literal application of Civil Code section 3513 seems to limit waiver
47 142 Pa. 581, 21 At. 986 (1891).
48 Ibid.
49 208 Ark. 106, 184 S.W.2d 953 (1945).
50 Id. at -, 184 S.W.2d at 955.
51 389 Pa. 78, 132 A.2d 275 (1957).
52 13 Misc. 2d 936, 187 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Surr. Ct. 1959). Note that this decision
concerns an appeal after trial. The citation to the 1958 decision on Amuso's Estate
in note 40 supra, concerns the same case, but on an appeal of the motions prior to
trial. Both decisions discuss fiduciary duty and waiver of accounting when there
is a private accounting or release. Only the 1959 decision discusses complete waiver.
53 Id. at -, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
54 See generally, 56 Am. JUR. Waiver § 7 (1947).
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to a single party transaction. But as already discussed, the courts
apparently interpret this rule in light of Civil Code section 14, allow-
ing waiver by more than one party.55 The holding in Middlecoff uses
no language which would limit waiver to the factual situation there
contained. Middlecoff has already interpreted the statutory require-
ments of accounting as being intended for the sole benefit of the
executors, beneficiaries, and creditors,5" i.e., the interested parties.
Hence one cannot argue that the accounting is a public policy re-
quirement not subject to waiver.
The only real argument against extending waiver of accounting
in California is that it relieves a fiduciary duty, thus increasing the
likelihood of fraud or misrepresentation. The statutory provisions
for accounting are safeguards for the parties interested in the dece-
dent's estateY7 These interested parties may contest the account if
they think something is amiss." As a general statement of the
fiduciary purpose of an executor's accounting, the following is apt:
"The purpose of an accounting is to secure a judicial evaluation of
the propriety of the representative's acts . . . ."" Such a judicial
evaluation protects the interested parties by reviewing the actions
of the executor-fiduciary as revealed in the accounting.
In Larrabee v. Tracy"° there is a good discussion of the exec-
utor's fiduciary relation to the beneficiaries of the estate, saying in
part that an executor is an officer of the court and must act like a
trustee."' Such being the role of the executor or administrator, a
good argument against waiver of accounting is that an accounting
helps to maintain high standards of fiduciary duty.
Other states have confronted the problems of waiving fiduciary
duty. In New York, the 1958 decision on Amuso's Estate62 attempts
to set out both sides of the problems of waiving the statutory require-
ments of accounting."8 After discussing the favorable view the courts
take toward private agreements which dispense with formal ac-
55 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
56 149 Cal. 94, 97, 84 Pac. 764, 765 (1906). The enactment of the Probate Code
in 1931 did not materially change the statutes interpreted by Middlecoif; see notes
19-21 supra.
57 Parsley v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 2d 446, 450, 104 P.2d 1073, 1075
(1940).
58 CAL. PROB. CODE § 927.
59 34 C.J.S. Executors & Administrators § 828 (1942).
60 21 Cal. 2d 645, 134 P.2d 265 (1943).
61 Id. at 650, 134 P.2d at 269. The court does not imply that the executor is
a trustee. "Trustee" is used in a general sense.
62 13 Misc. 2d 686, 176 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Surr. Ct. 1958). See note 52 supra for
an explanation of the differences between the 1958 and 1959 decisions on Amuso's
Estate.
63 13 Misc. 2d 686, -, 176 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
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counting, the court also points out a line of cases that emphasizes the
high standard imposed upon a fiduciary. The court quotes with ap-
proval6 4 that famous passage from Meinhard v. Salmon6" where
Justice Cardozo says, "Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arms length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties." 6 In the 1959 decision on Amuso's
Estate, after again mentioning the two lines of New York cases, one
favoring waiver, one compelling high standard of conduct from a
fiduciary, the court says,
In every case the ultimate duty of the fiduciary is to render to the
beneficiaries an accounting in some form. The nature of the ac-
counting depends upon the nature of the estate and the circumstances
present.6 7
Yet as mentioned earlier, this very case goes on to point out that
such ultimate duty may be waived by an affirmative act of the
beneficiary.6" In a Virginia case, Harris v. Citizens Bank & Trust
Co.,69 the court opposes any act which relieves an executor-fiduciary
of accounting. The court upheld a private settlement which waived
an accounting, but did so reluctantly, saying, "Contracts which
relieve fiduciaries from giving accounts of their stewardships are
not favored. ' 7°
In essence, then, the argument against waiver of accounting
is this: (a) the executor or administrator is a fiduciary, (b) a fidu-
ciary must act with the highest standards of care, (c) one means of
maintaining high standards of care is accounting to interested parties
and/or the court, and (d) anything that relieves any of the tradi-
tional duties of a fiduciary (such as waiver of accounting) is
disfavored.
Reconciliation
There is no question that in California an accounting by the
executor or administrator is, and should be, the norm, and waiver
the variant. Generally, the duty to account helps to keep the executor
on his fiduciary toes, thwarting the possibilities of fraud. However
the law must be flexible if justice is to be accomplished in all the
varied situations to which it is applied. While the norm may require
accounting, the option of the variant adds flexibility to those situa-
64 Id. at -, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
65 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
66 Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
67 13 Misc. 2d 936, -, 187 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
68 Ibid.
69 172 Va. 111, 200 S.E. 652 (1939).
70 Id. at -, 200 S.E. at 665.
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tions where an accounting may be unnecessary, or where a private
accounting may suffice.
Although waiver of accounting may be useful in providing flex-
ibility to the law, can it be reconciled with the high standards of
fiduciary duty? If it were true that to extend waiver of accounting
in California would materially remove control over the fiduciary
performance of the executor or administrator through the courts,
then extension would not be justified. But fiduciary standards would
not be unleashed by extending waiver, for two reasons.
First; waiver requires a voluntary and knowing relinquishment
of a benefit one has under the law.7' "Voluntary" and "knowing"
connote a situation where the waiving party knows what he is doing
in releasing the executor from his duty. If an alleged waiver is shown
to have been made under circumstances where the waiving parties
did not know what they were doing, then by definition, there has
been no waiver.
Second, California's Probate Code takes an almost paternal
attitude toward the estate, executor, and beneficiaries. County of
Los Angeles v. Morrison 2 says that, "The probate court or judge
is the guardian of estates of deceased persons . . . . ',7 Illustrating
this attitude is the Probate Code section that allows the court to
require an accounting on its own motion: "Whenever required by
the court or a judge thereof... upon its or his own motion ... the
executor or administrator must render... a verified account ....
Accordingly, notwithstanding any extension of waiver, or even
waiver under Middlecoff, the court must in effect grant its approval
of every waiver. If it does not approve, or if it suspects mismanage-
ment, the court need only require an accounting by its own motion.
Therefore the advantages of waiver-privacy, reduction of both ex-
pense and delay-could be available while court supervision over
the fiduciary remains.
By retaining court supervision through its discretionary ap-
proval, California approaches a reconciliation of waiver and fidu-
ciary duty. In New York, on the other hand, A muso's Estate at-
tempts reconciliation through burden of proof.
Taken together, the two decisions on Amuso's" Estate discuss
two conflicting lines of cases, one encouraging informal settlements
and accountings, and the other demanding the highest standards
71 See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
72 15 Cal. 2d 368, 101 P.2d 470 (1940).
73 Id. at 371, 101 P.2d at 472.
74 CAL. PROB. CODE § 921.
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of care from a fiduciary.75 The court resolves the conflict by
placing on the administrator who was released from his duty to
account the burden of proving that the informal accounting resulting
in release was handled fairly and without fraud or mismanagement. 78
After the administrator successfully demonstrated fair dealing, the
court in effect upheld an informal, oral accounting by refusing peti-
tioner's attempt to compel formal accounting.
77
Amuso's Estate does not attempt to reconcile fiduciary duty
with waiver in the situation of total waiver. As discussed earlier, the
court went no further than to affirm, by way of dictum, the possi-
bility of waiver when not accompanied by an informal accounting.7
The court noted that most cases upholding a release of accounting
involved some type of informal accounting.
79
In the final analysis, the shortcut of waiver cannot be fully
reconciled with the fiduciary duty to account. Common sense says
that the fewer times an executor-fiduciary must report to the court
and interested parties, the greater the possibility of fraud or mis-
management. But this does not mean that waiver should not be ex-
tended. There are sufficient opportunities for supervision and relief
under California's Probate Code at present to prevent fraud and
mismanagement even though waiver is extended beyond Middlecoff.
The real question is how far such an extension should go.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Presently in California, there is no law which directly supports
extension of waiver of accounting by the interested parties beyond
the Middlecoff circumstances. Neither is there any raw directly op-
posed. On the other hand, there are, as pointed out earlier, situations
like Shapiro involving waiver of comparable duties which indirectly
support an extension of waiver of accounting. Since waiver by more
than one beneficiary can be advantageous in certain circumstances,
there is a need for legislative clarification of the law on waiver of
accounting.
First, the statutory provision for waiver in general, Civil Code
section 3513, should be amended to affirm or extend its application
to groups as well as individuals. While not really necessary in light
of Civil Code section 14, such an amendment would codify the effect
75 13 Misc. 2d 686, -, 176 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (Surr. Ct. 1958); 13 Misc. 2d
936, -, 187 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
76 13 Misc. 2d 686, -, 176 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
77 13 Misc. 2d 936, -, 187 N.Y.S.2d 519, 524 (Surr. Ct. 1959).




of present case law."° The first sentence of section 3513 could be
amended to read, "Any person or group of persons may waive by
voluntary and affirmative act the advantage of a law or a duty re-
quired by law intended solely for his or their benefit." The present
prohibition of waiving laws established for public reasons should
remain. Including "affirmative act" narrows the possibility of misuse
or deceit in the general application of waiver.
Second, the accounting requirements of the Probate Code as it
stands should be untouched, but a section should be added to the
effect of the following suggestion:
WAIVER OF ACCOUNTING
When the time for filing or presenting claims against the estate has
expired, any or all persons interested in the estate may waive in
writing any accounting required of the executor or administrator
intended solely for his or their benefit. Waiver pursuant to this
section shall become effective only upon the approval of the court
or a judge thereof, acting in its or his sole discretion. Once so approved
waiver shall be conclusive against the waiving parties in the absence
of fraud, misrepresentation, or inequitable conduct of the executor
or administrator.
Such an addition to the Probate Code would permit waiver when
there was no argument among the persons interested in the estate.
Yet one dissenting beneficiary could demand the normal accounting
requirements, retaining the protection of present law. In addition,
the suggested section adheres to the philosophy of the probate court
as guardian of the estate"' by requiring approval of the court before
waiver of the statutory requirements of accounting is valid.
Whatever the changes, the present state of the law calls for
some clarification concerning the possibilities of waiver of account-
ing. Any legislative action should attempt to protect both the estate
and interested parties yet at the same time provide for increased
flexibility in adapting the law to workaday applications.
Win. F. Locke-Paddon
80 See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
81 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
